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Abstract 
According to the Standard Model account of religion, religious concepts tend to conform to 
“minimally counterintuitive” schemas. Laypeople may, to varying degrees, verbally endorse the 
abstract doctrines taught by professional theologians. But, outside the Sunday school exam room, 
the implicit representations that tend to guide people’s everyday thinking, feeling, and behavior 
are about minimally counterintuitive entities. According to the Standard Model, these implicit 
representations are the essential thing to be explained by the cognitive science of religion (CSR). 
It is argued here that this theoretical orientation of mainstream CSR misses a whole dimension of 
religiosity—the acceptance of certain religious authorities, that is, the acceptance of other 
people’s superior expertise. Average believers (especially in doctrinal traditions) tend to accept 
the authority of religious experts who espouse highly counterintuitive ideas that they (the 
laypeople) understand in a distorted form, if at all. These highly counterintuitive ideas are 
culturally successful because laypeople see them as being justified by people they have reason to 
regard as epistemic authorities. The tendency for people to endorse (without fully understanding) 
highly counterintuitive religious ideas espoused by intellectuals may explain parallels in the 
development of separate traditions (e.g., Judaism and Hinduism), as religious philosophers 
follow parallel lines of reasoning. 
 
Keywords: cognitive science of religion; Standard Model theory of religion; Mickey 
Mouse problem; Zeus problem; cultural transmission  
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1. Mainstream cognitive science of religion: The “Standard Model” 
 
The Talmud is 5,422 pages of dense argumentation about religious law and philosophy. 
Aquinas’s Summa Theologica contains extensive discussion of 631 questions, divided into 
thousands of sub-questions, at the heart of Christianity. The foundational texts of Hinduism—the 
Vedas and the Upanishads—are supplemented by a mind-boggling body of commentaries. 
Needless to say, only a tiny fraction of this information makes its way into the mind of the 
average Jew, Catholic, or Hindu. 
Mainstream cognitive science of religion (CSR) is not interested in the theological 
minutiae that occupy theologians and seminary students. It is the science of what makes it into 
the brains of typical believers and arouses real-life passion. It seeks to identify the 
neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie actual religious representations and reasoning. In 
giving an evolutionary account of these mechanisms, cognitive scientists seek to explain religion. 
If it turns out that the mechanisms originally evolved for purposes unrelated to religion (the 
dominant view), then religion is a byproduct of our evolved psychology (Atran & Henrich, 2010; 
Boyer, 2003). If it turns out that they evolved specifically because they gave rise to religious 
belief, then religious belief is itself an adaptation to perform some yet-to-be-identified function 
(Bulbulia, 2004). 
The “Standard Model” (SM; Boyer, 2005) account of religion, which is, as its name 
suggests, the standard account given in CSR, holds that religion is a byproduct. According to the 
SM, propositions formulated in certain ways resonate with our minds and tend to be believed by 
us. Specifically, we have innate assumptions about different kinds of objects and agents, and a 
disposition to believe in entities (real or imaginary) whose nature violates our expectations in one 
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or two respects, and which meet certain other basic criteria. As Atran (2002) writes: “All 
religions...involve counterintuitive beliefs in supernatural beings. Moreover, such beliefs are 
systematically counterintuitive in the same basic ways....[T]hese basic ways of entertaining 
supernatural beliefs are more or less predictable from a fairly limited set of species-specific 
cognitive structures” (p. 9). And Barrett (2004): “Our minds tend to consider and believe in 
agents that have a limited set of superhuman properties” (p. viii; italics added). 
The normal human mind, the SM says, is endowed with innate templates representing 
different ontological categories. The templates determine our assumptions concerning (a) 
biology, (b) psychology, and (c) physics about objects that are classified as being in a specific 
category. For example, if X is an animal, we assume, among other things, that Xs are produced 
by other Xs, and Xs react to the environment and move around. The ANIMAL template indicates 
possible and impossible ways in which various animals may differ from each other. Five 
ontological categories have been identified as playing a role in religion: (a) HUMAN, (b) 
ANIMAL, (c) PLANT, (d) ARTIFACT, and (e) NATURAL OBJECT (Atran, 2002, p. 98; 
Barrett, 2000, p. 31; Boyer, 2001, p. 78). Entities that violate, in one or two respects, the 
expectations dictated by these templates are termed “minimally counterintuitive” (MCI). 
Propositions that most resonate with us and are best remembered—and are therefore 
likely to be transmitted from person to person or generation to generation—are those that 
describe MCI objects and agents (Banerjee, Haque, & Spelke, 2013; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; 
Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006), while also engaging 
other inference systems (Atran, 2002; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Boyer, 2001). Such entities are 
more noteworthy to our minds than those that are merely unusual. People are more likely to 
remember that there was “a table...that felt sad when people left the room” than that there was “a 
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table made of chocolate.” The former proposition ascribes emotions to an artifact, violating our 
innate assumptions; the latter describes a kind of artifact—table—made out of an unusual 
material—chocolate—but without violating our innate assumptions about objects classified in 
that ontological category (Boyer, 2001, p. 80; see Atran, 2002, pp. 101–107). 
Recently, scholars of CSR have questioned whether MCI concepts are as pervasive in 
religion as the SM supposes. Purzycki and Willard (2016), for example, argue that SM theorists 
often use overly liberal criteria for identifying beliefs as MCI, and that most religious concepts 
may be generally attention-grabbing/surprising rather than specifically MCI (see also Willard, 
Henrich, & Norenzayan, 2016). Many religious entities designated by SM theorists as MCI may 
violate culturally relative schemas formed in individuals’ lifetimes rather than universal and 
innate assumptions (Russell & Gobet, 2013). The present paper reiterates and expands on the 
concern that religious concepts are often not MCI. It proposes an explanation for why, under 
certain conditions, highly counterintuitive religious concepts become more successful than 
simpler, more memorable, and more intuitive ones (whether those simpler concepts are MCI, 
intuitive, or merely surprising). In general, it is argued that people tend to adopt and transmit 
beliefs that they see as being explanatorily powerful while at the same time being logically 
consistent with other beliefs to which they are committed. Sometimes people see beliefs as 
justified because they are espoused by credible authorities. Under conditions that conduce to 
“doctrinal mode” religion (Whitehouse, 2002, 2004), theologians develop highly counterintuitive 
but more or less logically consistent religious doctrines. These doctrines are “highly 
counterintuitive” in the sense that they require the sustained application of effortful, System 2 
reasoning processes in order to be developed or learned. People come to accept the expertise of 
theologians, and accept their abstract ideas even without fully understanding them. 
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Section 2 critically analyses two purported discoveries that are at the heart of the SM, and 
which are used to justify the claim that the most successful god concepts are MCI. These are: (1) 
People who claim to believe in highly counterintuitive religious entities implicitly represent them 
as MCI agents; (2) the beliefs of theologians are radically different from—and have little 
relevance for—the beliefs of laypeople, which center on MCI agents. Section 3 examines the so-
called Mickey Mouse problem and the Zeus problem: Why, if people are disposed to believe in 
MCI agents, do they fail to believe in Mickey Mouse or (nowadays, at least) Zeus? In response 
to Mickey Mouse-type problems, Barrett (2008) proposes four criteria besides minimal 
counterintuitiveness that a god concept must possess in order to be successful (i.e., to be believed 
in, to elicit commitment, and to be transmitted from person to person). Examination of his 
discussion shows that in the end he resorts to commonsense explanations for why people 
disbelieve in entities like Mickey Mouse or Santa Claus—namely, because evidence does not 
support their existence. The four criteria are not sufficient to make god concepts successful, and 
so do not have the special explanatory power claimed for them by Barrett. Henrich’s (2009) 
claim that religious beliefs must be espoused by prestigious individuals who demonstrate 
“credibility enhancing displays” (CREDs) may be true, but it also does not solve the Mickey 
Mouse/Zeus problem, since it does not fully explain why people choose to follow certain CRED-
exhibiting prestigious individuals rather than others. The final section reexamines the two tenets 
of the SM discussed in Section 2 in light of the discussion in Section 3, arguing that the (explicit) 
beliefs that people transmit to each other are highly counterintuitive, and laypeople accepting the 
authority of (perceived) religious experts is an essential aspect of religious belief and behavior. 
This conclusion is used to explain parallels in the God concepts of Judaism and Hinduism. 
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2. Two tenets of the SM 
 
The SM is grounded on two essential tenets (Barrett, 2007, p. 769, describing them somewhat 
differently, identifies them as “two prominent findings of the field”). The first is that individuals’ 
implicit religious representations are different from their explicit representations (e.g., Atran, 
2002; Barrett, 1998, 1999; Barrett & Keil, 1996; Boyer, 2001).1 During formal religious 
education, usually in childhood (in Sunday school or the like), laypeople learn some of the 
abstract tenets of their religion. Christians learn, for example, that God is omnipotent and 
omniscient, that time itself is part of the creation, that God stands outside the world, and so on. If 
you administer a theology test to Sunday school-educated Christians asking questions like “Does 
God know everything?” or “Can God do only one thing at a time?” they repeat the answers they 
were taught (in this case, yes and no). But theology tests only tap into explicit representations 
which (according to the SM) exist largely independently of more intuitive—implicit—
representations that determine religious thought and feeling in everyday situations, and which 
underlie actual religious passions. To find out how people implicitly represent or reason about 
religion, you have to ask them questions under time pressure, high cognitive load, or other 
situations where they cannot, or are not inclined to, access the information (from semantic 
memory) that they memorized for Sunday school exams. 
Essentially the only evidence cited in support of this is a series of studies conducted by 
Barrett and Keil (see, e.g., Atran, 2002, p. 94; Atran & Henrich, 2010, p. 20; Boyer, 2001, p. 88; 
Dennett, 2006, p. 131; Lawson, 1999, p. 721; Norenzayan et al., 2006, p. 534). Barrett and Keil 
                                                 
1 These claims only apply to followers of doctrinal religions like Christianity. 
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(1996) and Barrett (1998) argued that when college students in the United States and India heard 
or read vignettes describing God acting supernaturally, they interpreted God as acting 
anthropomorphically. For example, if God was described as answering two prayers at once in 
different parts of the world, subjects remembered him as answering the prayers sequentially, as if 
he were subject to the same constraints as people.2 They concluded that although Christians and 
Hindus may explicitly represent God as having many supernatural properties, their implicit 
representation of him, which they employ in actual day-to-day religious reasoning, is highly 
anthropomorphic (and MCI). 
The second tenet of the SM is that while theologians might invent highly abstract God 
concepts, “[t]heological ideas that exceed [the MCI] cognitive optimum [are] likely [to] be 
distorted or ignored” (Barrett, 2007, p. 772; citing Boyer, 2001; Slone, 2004). On this view, 
priestly castes in literate societies produce complex religious ideas, generally in order to 
reinforce their monopoly on religious services. Though laypeople might profess to believe in 
some of the teachings of the priests, they do not generally understand them (see Boyer, 2001, pp. 
158, 278–285). Priests know a lot more about religious traditions than children learn, let alone 
remember, in religious school. The average believer can aver that “God can do anything.” A 
                                                 
2 There is some concern that the vignettes used in Barrett and Keil’s studies themselves 
contained anthropomorphism (Pyysiäinen, 2012, p. 35; Shtulman, 2008, p. 1125). Subjects may 
have correctly interpreted the anthropomorphic descriptions rather than wrongly introduced 
them. That issue is outside the scope of this paper. 
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theologian presumably knows the paradoxes generated by that proposition,3 and has some way of 
answering them. And the theologian presumably knows about all sorts of recondite doctrines that 
the layperson has never heard of. SM theorists emphasize that specialist theological traditions 
exist only in advanced, literate cultures—they are not a human universal—and in cultures where 
they do exist only a small percentage of people are versed in them (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2001). 
These two tenets are related because laypeople’s explicit beliefs/representations are 
influenced by the teachings of “literate theologians” (Boyer’s term). The simplified slogans that 
the folk know about their religious doctrines come from the priestly caste. The information gets 
systematically distorted (due to cognitive biases) when it passes from theological scholars 
through low-level teachers down to children or lay adults. Still, laypeople (in literate cultures) 
acquire some explicit knowledge of complex doctrines, and this knowledge is developed and 
disseminated by the religious intellectual elite. 
The SM treats the implicit representations that (supposedly) guide laypeople’s actual 
thinking, behavior, and feeling as the important thing to be explained. It sees as sideshow 
phenomena the rarified theological debate and official religious doctrines that laypeople either do 
not know about or verbally endorse but do not actually care about. Many cognitive psychologists 
dismiss believers’ explicit theological beliefs as mere “theological correctness” (Barrett, 1999, 
2007; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008), which “doesn’t determine people’s actual thoughts and 
behaviors” (Slone, 2004, p. 4). 
But focusing only on the implicit, or even explicit, representations and beliefs about God 
                                                 
3 E.g., can God learn something new? Or—the most famous one—can God make a stone too 
heavy for him to lift? 
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in people’s heads misses an important aspect of their relationship to religion. Namely, most 
seriously religious people believe in the authority of religious experts. They believe that the 
religious experts know better than they do, and they often defer to their judgments about what to 
do. Compare the (explicit) beliefs of laypeople about religion to their beliefs about physics or 
biology. The average nonexpert’s beliefs about physics and biology are systematically wrong, 
sometimes even after extensive exposure to true beliefs (Shtulman, 2017). Nevertheless, most 
nonexperts accept the authority of physicists and biologists, at least in nonpoliticized domains. 
Nonexperts may hold incorrect beliefs, but they acknowledge that, insofar as their views differ 
from those of experts, it is the experts who are right. When a collective decision must be made 
about how to fix a bridge or what building codes to establish, people defer to others whom they 
perceive to be epistemic authorities. If you gave random Catholics a theology test, you would 
probably discover as much ignorance as you would if you gave random non-physicists a test 
about physics. In both cases, you would be overlooking the belief of the test takers that some 
authorities know better than they do. By studying only the representations of God that people 
reveal implicitly, or even report explicitly, CSR misses a whole dimension of religiosity—the 
acceptance of certain authorities and the rejection of others.4 
                                                 
4 Religious and scientific authority are undoubtedly established in different ways, reflecting the 
difference between religion and science. Scientific authority is—or is supposed to be—grounded 
in the ability to make verifiable predictions. Religious authority is grounded in a perceived 
relationship with the divine or with mastery of religious principles. Still, there is a deep parallel 
in the way laypeople relate to religious vs. scientific authorities. A layperson who accepts a 
religious or scientific authority thereby holds that the authority’s beliefs about religion or 
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There is another problem with focusing only on believers’ implicit representations. The 
SM is supposed to be a theory about what religious ideas are transmitted, not just about how 
religious ideas are implicitly represented. MCI concepts are supposed to have a transmission 
advantage. But only verbally articulated, explicit representations can be transmitted. As shall be 
discussed, even if religious concepts are implicitly represented as MCI, there is reason to think 
that many of the most successful god concepts that are transmitted from person to person are in 
fact highly counterintuitive (cf. Whitehouse, 2004). 
 
3. What makes god concepts successful? The Mickey Mouse problem and the Zeus problem 
 
What religious beliefs people adopt cannot be a simple function of the content of the beliefs to 
which they are exposed, as SM theorists have acknowledged. Most everyone is exposed to the 
ideas of the Christian God and to Zeus. Eighteen hundred years ago some people believed in the 
former and some in the latter. Today, many people believe in the Christian God and practically 
no one takes the existence of Zeus as a serious possibility. Gervais and Henrich (2010) call this 
the “Zeus Problem.” 
The “Mickey Mouse problem” is almost as old as the SM itself—to SM theorists it has 
been seen as the major challenge for their theory. Atran recounts posing this problem at a 
conference in 1999. Cognitive scientists like Barrett, Boyer, and Lawson outlined the basic 
premises of what came to be known as the SM. In Atran’s (2002) words: 
                                                 
science, respectively, are more reliable than what they themselves are able to report in a survey 
or on a test. 
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They offered new data and interpretations for a convincing view of religion, namely, as a 
family of cognitive processes to produce minimally counterintuitive worlds that are 
attention-arresting, hence readily memorable and liable to cultural transmission, 
selection, and survival. But to the question I posed—“How, in principle, does this view 
distinguish Mickey Mouse from God, or fantasy from beliefs one is willing to die for?”—
there was acknowledgment that nothing in the cognitive literature at the time offered an 
answer. (p. x) 
 
The Mickey Mouse problem raises two questions at once: Why do we fail to believe in, and why 
do we fail to become committed to, some MCI entities? The commonsense answer to the former 
is that no one is tempted to believe in Mickey Mouse because he is explicitly presented as a 
fictional entity. When Mickey Mouse is depicted in cartoons, an explicit message appears 
declaring that he is a character imagined (not brought into existence) by Walt Disney and Ub 
Iwerks. There is also a commonsense answer to the latter question. Just as we do not typically 
believe in something without evidence (broadly construed), we do not commit ourselves to 
something without reason—the thing in question must be perceived as making a difference to our 
lives. Even if there were compelling evidence to believe that Mickey Mouse existed, it is 
unlikely that Mickey Mouse believers would be committed to him in the sense that they would 
“willingly sacrifice even their lives to uphold” this belief (to use Atran’s, 2002, p. 14, 
expression). 
Some of the entities and phenomena discovered or described by science are MCI in the 
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technical sense of violating innate ontological templates5 in one or two respects (cf. Barrett, 
2008, p. 151, n. 1). For example, magnets are physical objects (or artifacts) that can be moved 
without touching them. Magnets are MCI objects that actually exist and in which practically 
everyone believes, but people are not normally passionately committed to magnets. 
People seem to become passionate about their beliefs—in MCI religious entities, 
scientific phenomena, straightforward intuitive phenomena, or even highly counterintuitive 
entities—when they see their welfare (in this life or the next) as being tied to those beliefs. 
Religious Catholics may be passionate about belief in the Trinity because (leaving caveats aside) 
they think that holding this belief is required to go to heaven. (The notion that the Trinity and the 
Abrahamic God are MCI concepts, as SM theorists claim [see, e.g., Boyer, 2001], will be 
questioned later.) At issue is whether the SM can explain why religious beliefs elicit passion 
without resorting to the commonsense fact that people care about things that make a difference to 
them. 
Atran (2002) concludes that “purely cognitive” theories of religion are insufficient 
because they are “motiveless” (p. 264). They need to be supplemented, he says, with theories 
about why we believe in some MCI entities and not others, and what makes us committed to 
such entities. Barrett acknowledges that being MCI is not enough to be a successful god concept, 
and offers a supplementation to the SM of the sort Atran called for: 
 
[S]uccessful god concepts...must be (1) counterintuitive, (2) an intentional agent, (3) 
possessing strategic information, (4) able to act in the human world in detectable ways 
                                                 
5 Assuming such ontological templates exist with the properties ascribed to them by the SM. 
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and (5) capable of motivating behaviors that reinforce belief. [Because] Santa Claus 
appears to be only inconsistently represented as having all five requisite features Santa 
has failed to develop a community of true believers and cult. (Barrett, 2008, p. 149) 
 
However, Barrett continues, Santa’s cultural prominence is a consequence of the Santa concept 
“approximat[ing] a successful god concept more closely than other widespread cultural 
characters such as Mickey Mouse.” 
According to Barrett, on the surface Santa is MCI (a flying person), an intentional agent, 
he possesses strategic information (about whether you have been bad or good), his acts (leaving 
presents) are detectable, and he motivates reinforcing behaviors (children leave out milk and 
cookies for him). “[O]n closer examination,” Barrett says, “Santa’s failure as a god may come 
from the fact that [he] is variably represented across individuals such that he fails to satisfy all of 
the criteria.” He claims that, in films, Santa is often represented not as a (minimally) 
counterintuitive being, but as a regular person who uses magic. Barrett informally surveyed 12 
American university students and found that “only six unambiguously attributed to Santa a 
counterintuitive property (five mentioned his immortality, four attributed counterintuitive 
knowledge)” (p. 155). Santa may know whether people are morally good or bad “on balance,” 
but possessing strategic information involves “knowing whether someone has done or plans to 
do a particular morally bad or good act,” and neither “popular media” nor the 12 survey 
participants clearly represent Santa as having this information. Although Santa is represented as 
acting in the world in detectable ways, this activity is restricted in time, place, and form, in 
comparison with successful god concepts, which typically postulate gods that act throughout the 
year in a variety of ways. The behaviors that the Santa concept motivates to reinforce belief are 
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similarly restricted in time—to “one annual visit” (p. 157). 
In the end, Barrett acknowledges that belief in Santa may fail to take hold in part because 
his “alleged activities...may be more simply explained by appealing to parents instead of Santa” 
(p. 157). This is presumably true, but Barrett is just resorting to the commonsense explanation of 
disbelief in Santa, namely, people disbelieve in him because they know he is made up and that 
the evidence for his existence (presents under the tree, disappearing cookies) is planted. He also 
notes that, at a certain point, children realize that visiting every household with children on one 
night is “impossible,” at least for a human. But why do children not just assume that Santa 
possesses the necessary “counterintuitive” properties that would allow him to accomplish this 
feat—the same way they (often) conclude that God, which, according to Barrett, we represent 
anthropomorphically as an MCI person (Barrett & Keil, 1996), possesses the counterintuitive 
properties that allow him to perform the actions attributed to him? Besides 
counterintuitiveness/minimal counterintuitiveness, the other four criteria that Barrett claims a 
god concept must satisfy in order to be successful turn out to be roundabout ways of saying that 
people care about things that make a difference to their lives (i.e., things that affect them and 
influence their behavior). While this may be true, it pushes the explanatory problem back to the 
question of how people form judgements about what is plausible or supported by evidence. 
So let us turn to that question—how do people form judgments about what is “plausible” 
or “supported by evidence”? On the one hand, in certain domains and contexts people 
systematically adopt false beliefs. Our procedures for assessing beliefs as plausible are not 
scientific (Knobe, 2010; Shtulman, 2017). On the other hand, not all of our intuitively formed 
beliefs are false. Our intuitions responsible for belief formation do guide us toward the truth in 
some contexts, and often protect us against accepting blatant lies. 
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Shtulman (2017) notes that one of the three “hallmarks” of our intuitive (i.e., 
nonscientific) theories is that they are “coherent,” embodying “a logically consistent set of 
beliefs and expectations” (p. 10). Even though people hold incorrect views about, for example, 
physics, they reason about physics (from false premises) more or less consistently. The fact that 
untrained people do not reason in the same way as scientists does not mean that they hold 
obviously contradictory views, or that there is no internal logic to their understanding of how 
things work. A study cited by Shtulman provides a nice illustration of this in children. In the 
“tubes task,” winding tubes emanate from buckets so that the top of each tube stands directly 
over a bucket, but not the one to which it itself is connected. Thus, the top of the tube connected 
to bucket A may be positioned directly over bucket B or C. If you ask children younger than four 
in which bucket a ball dropped in a certain tube will fall, they say that it will fall into the bucket 
directly underneath the top of the tube, thereby demonstrating a “gravity error.” However, if 
toddlers see where the ball fell themselves, or if they have attained understanding of how the 
apparatus actually works, they cannot be “talked into making a gravity error” (Shtulman, 2017, 
p. 68; citing Jaswal, 2010). In their analysis of how children learn through testimony, Harris and 
Koenig (2006) note that very young children “rework what they are told so as to arrive at a 
coherent conceptualization” (p. 508). 
Even very young children do not passively receive testimony from normally trusted 
sources/epistemic authorities. They actively try to incorporate the testimony they receive into a 
coherent causal picture. If the testimony cannot be thus incorporated then it may be simply 
rejected. In regard to belief in Santa, the reality of Santa is affirmed by bona fide epistemic 
authorities (e.g., parents) and Santa’s existence explains some observable phenomena (presents 
and eaten cookies). When children learn that it is their parents who left the presents and ate the 
17 
 
cookies, the proposition that parents lied about Santa becomes the only explanation that accounts 
for all the data the child seeks to explain. The value placed on consistency in our beliefs 
manifests early in life. 
To solve the Mickey Mouse/Zeus problem, Henrich (2009) postulates an innate learning 
bias underlying cultural transmission. Humans acquire a great deal of crucial adaptive 
information by cultural learning. In order to extract information that is most likely to lead to 
adaptive outcomes, we have evolved biases that make us learn selectively. Chief among these 
biases are a tendency to copy successful rather than unsuccessful individuals, and to adopt the 
beliefs of the majority rather than the minority (Henrich, 2016; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). 
Henrich (2009) notes that our tendency to learn from successful or prestigious individuals, 
combined with our linguistic abilities, leaves us vulnerable to exploitation. At no cost to 
themselves, successful/prestigious people can falsely express beliefs that, when adopted by 
others, harm the learners but benefit the teachers (e.g., “The ancestors speak through me and they 
want you to...”). To protect ourselves from exploitation, we have, Henrich suggests, evolved to 
selectively learn from prestigious people only when their espoused beliefs are accompanied by 
“credibility enhancing displays” (CREDs). CREDs are actions that the espouser of a belief would 
be unlikely to perform unless their belief was sincere. 
Henrich argues that people’s demand for CREDs could explain why many religions place 
so much emphasis on martyrs, and why religious authorities in many traditions engage in 
conspicuous acts of self-deprivation such as fasting and celibacy. He cites evidence that the 
public torture and executions of Christians in ancient Rome, for example, played an important 
role in inspiring converts. 
On Henrich’s view, Mickey Mouse could become a God if belief in him were associated 
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with CREDs in “prestigious individuals or large groups,” especially by models of the same sex 
and ethnicity as the learners. He says: “From the perspective of a learner, the difference between 
Mickey and Yahweh, or Yahweh and Zeus, is that learners observe members of their social 
group, including their chosen models, performing CREDs” (p. 258). 
The demands for CREDs are surely a real phenomenon, and it quite probably explains 
important aspects of religion like the significance of martyrs and priestly celibacy. Still, as an 
answer to the Mickey Mouse/Zeus problem, it faces some of the same issues as Barrett’s 
proposed answer. Henrich says that some people believe in Yahweh but not cartoon characters or 
ancient Greek Gods because “members of their social group, including their chosen models,” 
perform CREDs. But how do people, both as individuals and as groups, choose their models?—
or even their groups? The Christians who were martyred in the colosseum in ancient Rome were 
the opposite of prestigious, they were not the only people willing to sacrifice themselves for their 
religious beliefs, initially they were a small minority, and many of them were perceived as 
belonging to a different ethnicity than the Romans they inspired to convert. Their willingness to 
sacrifice themselves might have contributed to the success of Christianity, but that cannot be the 
only factor. Consider a prestigious person in the United States whom many people have chosen 
as a model: Christian evangelist Pat Robertson. If Pat Robertson converted to Catholicism, he 
would surely loose many of his followers, though, if he were convincing enough, some of his 
followers would probably convert with him. (The very act of becoming a Catholic might be a 
CRED for Robertson, since he would thereby be hazarding his established power, reputation, and 
legacy.) If he converted to Mickey Mouse or Zeus worship, even if his conversion were 
accompanied by CREDs that left no doubt about his sincerity, he would presumably be rejected 
as a model by practically everyone. Prestige and CREDs are important cues that direct people to 
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consider copying potential models, but it is clear that the presence of these cues is not sufficient 
to trigger cultural transmission. Otherwise ancient Romans would not have copied the martyred 
Christians who were of low prestige and generally of a different ethnicity (i.e., Jewish). 
 
3.1. Is minimal counterintuitiveness necessary? 
 
The minimal counterintuitiveness criterion claims that religious propositions must conform to a 
certain schema (i.e., an MCI one) to maximize their chance of success. According to Barrett 
(2008), although theoretically the objects of religious belief could have many highly 
counterintuitive properties, “[i]n practice, a large number of counterintuitive properties 
undermines conceptual structure to the point that it lacks coherence and might no longer qualify 
as a concept” (p. 151). He asks us to compare an MCI concept with a highly counterintuitive 
one: an “invisible buffalo” vs. “an invisible buffalo that is immortal, made of steel, experiences 
time backwards, fails to exist on Saturdays, gains nourishment from ideas, and gives birth to 
kittens.” He offers the former (MCI) concept as a “strong candidate[] for successful spread,” 
whereas the latter (highly counterintuitive) one is just “a list of attributes instead of a coherent 
concept.” 
What exactly does Barrett mean when he says that the invisible buffalo is a stronger 
candidate for “successful spread,” or for a “successful god concept,” than the buffalo with many 
counterintuitive properties? In fact neither concept seems to be part of any religion.6 Our 
                                                 
6 Belief in something like buffalo spirits may be part of some Native American traditions, but 
these can be distinguished from buffaloes that simply cannot be seen. 
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intuition that an invisible buffalo is more likely to be a part of a religion than the one that is 
invisible, immortal, made of steel, etc. might not be due to the fact that MCI concepts resonate 
with or sound more plausible to us. An alternative explanation is that we could more easily 
imagine a religious system in which invisible buffalos might serve an intelligible purpose: 
Maybe they guard the plains from evil spirits, or serve as food for dead hunters. That is, invisible 
buffalos strike us as “candidates” for spread because we can imagine their existence being 
justified in a religious system. The other, highly counterintuitive buffalo contains some 
properties that might not make sense at all (“experiences time backwards”), or that do not make 
sense without explanation (most of the rest of the properties). In contrast with the merely 
invisible buffalo, it is practically impossible to imagine a function that the highly counterintuitive 
buffalo might play in a religious system. 
In other words, to illustrate the idea that MCI concepts are more plausible candidates for 
religious/god concepts than highly counterintuitive ones, Barrett compares (here and elsewhere) 
a simple MCI concept that could easily be imagined to play an intelligible role in a religious 
system, and a highly counterintuitive concept whose counterintuitive properties are random, 
incoherent, or potentially contradictory. The MCI concept seems like a better candidate for 
belief. But is it because it is MCI? To test the SM account of religion we should compare MCI 
concepts with highly counterintuitive concepts that are equally coherent. If we do that, it is easy 
to come up with highly counterintuitive concepts that are much better candidates for successful 
transmission than some MCI ones. For example, the Islamic God has many counterintuitive 
properties: omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, lack of a physical body, and so on. An 
“invisible potato”—to use another of Barrett’s (p. 152) examples—has only one. Yet 23% of 
people on earth (ostensibly) believe in the Islamic God, another 33% believe in a similarly 
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described Christian God, and no one believes in an invisible potato although Barrett claims that 
“an invisible potato is a good candidate for a god concept” (p. 152). 
This brings us back to the two fundamental tenets of the SM—“two prominent findings 
of [CSR]” (Barrett, 2007, p. 769)—discussed in Section 2. SM advocates will say that (1) 
religious Christians and Muslims do not implicitly represent God as a highly counterintuitive 
agent, but as an MCI one, and (2) even the more counterintuitive, “theologically correct” 
(Barrett, 1999, 2007) explicit representations of God held by typical believers are significantly 
simplified and distorted versions of the abstract, sophisticated God concepts held (explicitly) by 
theologians. Even if we accept this, we are still faced with the fact that the most successful God 
concepts—at least the most successful explicit God concepts—are nothing like “invisible 
potatoes” (or invisible potatoes that also meet the other four criteria that Barrett claims make for 
a successful god concept—e.g., an invisible potato that magically punishes people for moral 
transgressions or if they fail to perform daily sacrifices to it). SM theorists argue that we 
implicitly represent religious entities such as the Abrahamic God as MCI agents, but the SM is 
also supposed to be a theory about what sorts of concepts are transmitted from person to person. 
And what is transmitted from person to person are verbally expressed explicit representations. 
Among Muslims, Christians, and Hindus, explicit representations are of a highly counterintuitive 
God(s). If that is the case, then the SM, as it is usually formulated, can at best claim to be a 
theory about how explicit god concepts are implicitly represented, not what kinds of concepts are 
actually culturally transmitted, or enjoy a transmission advantage. 
Whitehouse (2002, 2004) distinguishes two “modes” of religiosity. The “imagistic mode” 
involves the performance of infrequent, high-arousal rituals that make a deep impression that is 
encoded in episodic memory. These rituals stimulate participants to ruminate about their 
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meaning, causing them to experience private revelations about their deeper religious 
significance—what Whitehouse terms “spontaneous exegetical reflection.” In contrast, the 
“doctrinal mode” involves the performance of frequent, low-arousal rituals that are to a large 
extent encoded as procedural knowledge. In the doctrinal mode, people tend to learn rituals by 
rote and perform them out of habit. Low-arousal, high-frequency rituals tend not to trigger the 
private revelations brought about by spontaneous exegetical reflection. This leaves an opening 
for religious experts to supply their own interpretations of rituals to the participants, and to drill 
these interpretations into their mind through repetition. In Whitehouse’s view, religion in either 
mode tends not to conform to the easy-to-remember, MCI “cognitive optimum position.” 
Whitehouse notes that Boyer’s (2001) theory (i.e., the SM) predicts that the religious 
concepts of “preliterate, localized traditions” should tend to fall around the cognitive optimum 
position, and to be radically different from the beliefs of the literate priests. The prediction is not 
borne out. He says: 
 
Detailed ethnographic evidence on a great range of small-scale nonliterate cultures 
strongly suggests otherwise. Australian Aboriginal ideas about the “dreamtime” or 
(“dreaming”) provide a good case in point. Extensive direct study of these traditions has 
revealed the presence of dauntingly elaborate bodies of philosophical and cosmological 
knowledge that require many years of intensive contemplation to develop and mature.... 
Similar [findings] have been made with regard to the cosmologies of small-scale, 
nonliterate societies in Amazonia..., Africa..., and Melanesia....The overall impression 
from ethnographic research is that nonliterate societies, in general, do not deal in 
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religious concepts that are closer to the cognitive optimum than those of literate societies. 
(Whitehouse, 2004, pp. 79–80) 
 
Without the right kinds of social support, both imagistic and doctrinal religions will tend to drift 
toward concepts and practices that are closer to the cognitive optimum (pp. 76, 135). 
Nevertheless, societies under all conditions in which humans live tend to gravitate toward 
religiosity in one or the other (or sometimes even a combination) of these modes. “[R]eligion 
is...a domain of human thought and action that typically struggles against the constraints of 
intuitive cognition” (p. 169). MCI concepts like ghosts and magic rivers are also found across 
societies, but there is more than that to the religions of even preliterate hunter–gatherers that lack 
anything like a professional priestly caste. 
The question, then, is why imagistic and doctrinal modes of religiosity are such powerful 
“attractor positions” (Sperber, 1996) when they are both counterintuitive, hence inherently less 
believable (cf. Pyysiäinen, 2003, pp. 112–113), and violate too many of our innate ontological 
assumptions to have any special resonance with our mind or enjoy a memory advantage. The fact 
that these religious ideas are endorsed by authorities who demonstrate CREDs, as Henrich 
argued, is part of the story. But what makes authorities all over the world in every human society 
independently promulgate such ideas, and what makes people accept the claims of these 
authorities rather than others who may also exhibit CREDs? 
Whitehouse (2002) notes that doctrinal religions are typically “associated with highly 
developed forms of rhetoric and logically integrated theology” (p. 298). This is the result of 
selection on techniques of oration over time. People believe in doctrines that are “persuasive.” If 
conditions are right for religious experts to spread standardized doctrines (namely, people engage 
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in routinized rituals that do not trigger too much spontaneous exegetical reflection), the most 
persuasive ideas will tend to be preserved and to proliferate. The religious doctrines and the 
techniques for disseminating and reinforcing them that survive the competition will often be able 
to spread outside the group where they originally developed, thus creating large, anonymous 
communities of coreligionists. 
To understand why certain god concepts, such as those of Abrahamic and Hindu 
traditions, have become so popular, it may be necessary consider why many people come to 
think that these concepts are logical and explanatorily powerful. Even if people often employ 
theologically incorrect concepts in online reasoning, the fact that they explicitly endorse, 
transmit, and are sometimes even “willing to lay down their lives to preserve and defend” 
(Whitehouse, 2004, p. 151) these explicit concepts and the practices based on them means that 
theologically correct beliefs are more than a superficial aspect of religion. 
 
4. Religious authority and the logical development of doctrine: An explanation of parallel 
god concepts 
 
There is no doubt that lay believers in religions like Christianity have different explicit God 
concepts than educated theologians. This is because the sophisticated, abstract God concepts that 
theologians possess are difficult to acquire. The concepts are built on philosophical ideas that 
require time, training, motivation, and a certain amount of intellectual talent to grasp. But if lay 
believers’ ignorance of the recondite doctrines of their religion is, as suggested earlier, analogous 
to the average American’s ignorance of engineering, it is misleading to identify laypeople’s true 
(explicit) religious beliefs with those that they can report in a test or survey. Accepting the 
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authority of certain religious experts—deferring to their judgment in religious matters, 
acknowledging that one’s own understanding is inferior to that of the experts—is an important 
element of religiosity. Fully explaining religion requires explaining how people come to accept 
certain religious authorities. 
Even though the explicit religious beliefs of laypeople are less sophisticated than those of 
theologians, advocates of the SM have not provided convincing evidence that the most 
successful lay beliefs are actually MCI (Whitehouse, 2004). Though SM theorists claim that 
children and adults come to implicitly represent God as having humanlike limitations, Christian, 
Muslim, and Hindu adults do not teach their children that God can (e.g.) only answer one prayer 
at a time. Rather, they teach their children things like “God can do anything.” What is explicitly 
transmitted is highly counterintuitive. Even if minimally counterintuitive concepts have a 
transmission advantage in certain contexts, this does not seem to be the explanation for religion 
in general. 
If the arguments in this paper are right, the way to better explain certain aspects of 
religion is to discover the properties that make propositions in general—not religious 
propositions specifically—seem credible to us. Virtually no one above age 12 believes in Santa 
Claus. As discussed above, Barrett himself acknowledges that the reason may be (at least in part) 
because we learn at a certain point that there is no compelling evidence for Santa’s existence—in 
Barrett’s words: “[Santa’s] alleged activities...may be more simply explained by appealing to 
parents.” The explanation for why people adopt beliefs is not necessarily that the beliefs conform 
to a special template. It may be that they see those beliefs as being justified. Sometimes 
religious, rather than naturalistic, propositions might be perceived as “simpl[er]” explanations of 
important phenomena. 
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It seems that people are persuaded to accept doctrinal religions by a combination of the 
plausibility of what they can understand and the intellectual credibility of the experts who 
preserve esoteric knowledge and speak with authority on doctrine. The cognitive mechanisms 
that underlie this process are the same as those that lead untrained Americans to hold certain 
beliefs (or intuitions) about physics while acknowledging that the beliefs of physicists are more 
likely to be correct and deferring to recognized authorities when a collective decision must be 
made that is related to their domain of expertise. 
Abstract religious ideas are developed by the application of System 2 reasoning to more 
or less intuitive premises. System 2 reasoning is conscious, effortful, and difficult. Without a 
deliberate commitment to engage System 2, people tend to revert to intuitive, System 1 reasoning 
(Kahneman, 2011). The most successful religions today in terms of numbers of adherents—
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism—teach ideas that were developed over the course 
of thousands of years. Some of these abstract ideas may, through learning, be encoded in our 
minds as schemas that thereby become intuitive and incorporated into System 1 (see Purzycki & 
Willard, 2016), but some theological ideas are far too abstract for this (e.g., the Christian Trinity 
or ways to reconcile free will and divine providence). Under conditions that do not conduce to 
System 2 thinking, people are sure to revert to the intuitive theological beliefs that have been 
studied by mainstream CSR (cf. Slone, 2004). But cultural transmission does not generally occur 
under those conditions. Parents and teachers impart to children explicit beliefs that they learned 
and comprehended (more or less accurately) by means of System 2. 
The idea that explicit religious concepts proliferate because people find them logically 
compelling could explain certain parallels among separately developed religious traditions. For 
example, Slone (2005) shows that there are striking parallels in the theological debates 
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reconciling free will and God’s omnipotence in Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. In 
each of these traditions, theologians recognized a tension between our experience of free human 
agency and the postulated existence of powerful (or all-powerful) gods, particular creator gods. 
In each tradition, theologians advocated three kinds of approaches: (a) free will is real, (b) the 
power of god(s) precludes the possibility of free will, or (c) a “combinatorial position” allowing 
for the limited exercise of free will within constraints imposed by God(s). 
Slone explains these parallel developments as the consequence of applying “implicational 
logic” to religious systems. When religion takes on the doctrinal mode, theologians must make 
the system logically coherent in order to persuade large numbers of people to accept it (see 
Whitehouse, 2004, p. 123). Because doctrinal religions tend to spread among large number of 
people in different populations, Slone argues that it is necessary to attribute more and more 
power to God(s) in order for him to take on his growing responsibilities. This eventually leads to 
the premise that God is all powerful, which, in conjunction with our experience-based belief in 
free will, generates a paradox. The logic of the paradox allows for only a few possible solutions, 
so it was inevitable that the same variety of approaches would be taken in different traditions. 
As another example, take the concept of the creator in Judaism and Hinduism. Both 
religions hold that the world was created by a divine agent. This generated a problem, namely, if 
the world was created, why did the creator not need to be created? Theologians in both traditions 
solved the problem in analogous ways. 
The names of God in Judaism and Hinduism convey the same philosophical message, 
namely, that God’s existence is fundamentally different from that of anything in the creation. 
The principle name of God in Judaism (YHWH) is derived from the Hebrew verb “to be,” 
indicating that “being” is an intrinsic part of his nature. The creator in Hinduism is called 
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Svayambhu, meaning “self-existent” or “self-causing,” conveying virtually the same idea (see 
Manusmrti, 1886, 1.3–4, 1.7). 
Both Judaism and Hinduism hold that the creator’s essence is incomprehensible, though 
he (or it) chooses to reveal certain aspects of his nature in such a way that we can comprehend it. 
Although his nature is beyond comprehension, his manifestation in the world can be understood 
and described to some extent in human terms. According to Jewish tradition, we cannot know or 
say anything about God’s nature, but we can talk about his actions, or will—that is to say, the 
principles by which he runs the world (Luzzatto, 1735/1998, opening 1; Maimonides, 1190/1963, 
1.54). So, for example, we can know that God punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous. 
We can also say that he hates the wicked and loves the righteous. He does not actually 
experience the emotions of love and hate, but we can describe his actions as if they were 
motivated by humanlike emotions. 
Hindu theologians distinguish Nirguna (“attributeless”) from Saguna (“with qualities”) 
Brahman (God). Nirguna Brahman is the true, incomprehensible form of Brahman, and it is 
described only as what it is not, or in contradictory terms, i.e., “Brahman is X and not-X.” A 
famous passage in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad says: “Now, therefore, the description of 
Brahman: ‘Not this, not this’; for there is no other and more appropriate description than this 
‘Not this’” (2.3.6). In contrast, Saguna Brahman can be described with regular adjectives. 
Jewish and Hindu sources use almost identical analogies to illustrate the relationship 
between God’s unknowable essence and his knowable worldly manifestations. Maimonides 
(1190/1963) explains: “[T]hough an agent is one, diverse actions may proceed from him, even if 
he does not possess will and all the more if he acts through will.” A fire has different effects on 
different things: “it melts some things, makes others hard, cooks and burns, bleaches and 
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blackens....[But fire] performs all these actions by virtue of one active quality, namely, heat” 
(1.53). In the same way, God is a single, unchanging entity, but manifests in the world in 
seemingly different ways at different times. The Katha Upanishad says that, though Brahman is 
an unchanging, unconflicted being, he manifests in the world through individuals atmans (souls), 
causing a variety of different effects, like “the same non-dual fire...becomes different according 
to whatever it burns” (2.2.9). The Upanishad continues: “There is one Supreme Ruler, the inmost 
Self of all beings, who makes His one form manifold” (2.2.12). 
Both Judaism and Hinduism teach that time itself is part of God’s creation. The Jewish 
commentator Nachmanides derives this from the biblical verse, “Because six days (sic) God 
created the heavens and the earth...”—not in six days God created the heavens and the earth, but 
God created six days, the heavens, and the earth (Nachmanides, 13th century/1974, on Exodus 
20:11). The Hindu lawgiver Manu says: “Time and the divisions of time, the lunar mansions and 
the planets, the rivers, the oceans, the mountains, plains, and uneven ground,...this whole 
creation he [Svayambhu] likewise produced, as he desires to call these beings into existence” 
(Manusmrti, 1886, 1.24–25). Judaism and Hinduism explain God’s relationship with time in the 
same way: He is both outside and inside time. His true essence is beyond time, but in his 
capacity of supervisor of the world in Judaism, or Saguna Brahman in Hinduism, he is in time.7 
The forgoing, extremely abbreviated overview of how God is conceived in Judaism and 
Hinduism does not, of course, begin to do justice to the exceedingly complicated philosophical 
discussion in these traditions carried out over the course of thousands of years. But some broad 
                                                 
7 Christian theologians followed a different line of reasoning and concluded that God is outside 
of time (Augustine, 397–400/1998). 
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parallels clearly do exist between the traditions. The point of drawing attention to this is as 
follows. To really understand how God is conceived in a religion like Judaism or Hinduism 
requires intensive study, which not all followers have the opportunity to undertake. The average 
believer will necessarily have a distorted understanding of the sophisticated God concept 
possessed by the elites, and will have virtually no understanding of the philosophical niceties of 
the concept that were worked out over the centuries or even millennia. Yet somehow believers in 
different traditions come to attach themselves to authorities who develop ideas using the same 
principles of logic. As a result, theologians in different traditions may reach parallel conclusions, 
or follow different lines of reasoning and deviate from each other in semi-predictable ways. This 
is a religious phenomenon that requires explanation, and it cannot be illuminated only by 
studying the implicit or explicit God concepts of typical believers. 
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